Abstract. We study two player pursuit-evasion games with concurrent moves, infinite horizon, and discounted rewards. The players have partial observability, however, the evader is given an advantage of knowing the current position of the units of the pursuer. We show that (1) value functions of this game depend only on the position of the pursuing units and the belief the pursuer has about the position of the evader, and (2) that they are piecewise linear convex functions in the belief. Finally, we exploit this representation of value functions and design a value iteration algorithm that approximates the value of the game.
Introduction
We consider two player finite-state discrete-time zero-sum partially observable stochastic game (POSG) modeling a pursuit-evasion scenario played on a finite graph. In this game a team of centrally controlled pursuing units (a pursuer ) aims to locate and capture an evader, while the evader aims for the opposite. Such problems often arise in robotics and security domains [14, 2] .
We focus on the concurrent setup where both players act simultaneously and we aim to find robust strategies of the pursuer against the worst-case evader. Specifically, we assume that the evader knows the positions of the pursuing units and her only uncertainty is the strategy of the pursuer and the move that will be performed in the current time step. We assume games with infinite horizon and discounted rewards, where the value of the game exists [4] , and we approximate optimal strategies of the pursuer.
Our approach extends partially observable models from decision theory, Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) [11, 8, 9, 12] , where a single agent is supposed to find an optimal plan in a stochastic environment. We show that in our pursuit-evasion games the value functions that express the expected utility of the pursuer depend only on the position of the pursuing units and the belief about the position of the evader, but not the exact history of the actions of the pursuer. Despite the fact that players require randomized (or mixed) strategies, the value functions remain piecewise linear and convex, and we can approximate them by means of dynamic programming similar to the one for POMDPs [11, 8] . Finally, we show that there is a unique set of value functions (each corresponding to one initial position of the pursuer) solving the infinite-horizon game.
Related Work
A similar model with one-sided partial observability where one of the players has a perfect information was presented by McEneaney [7] . Authors assumed that the player with perfect information knows the action the opponent plays at the current stage. Due to the turn-based character of such game, the authors consider only pure strategies.
Our setting with concurrent moves better corresponds to the real-world situations that occur in real time. The evader does not know the action taken by the pursuer in the current stage; hence, the pursuer may need to use randomized strategies. However, allowing randomized strategies provides challenges when designing the dynamic programming operator that we address in this paper.
Another model that uses one-sided partial observability was considered by Chatterjee et al. [1] , however with reachability and safety objectives (a player either wants to reach a set of target states or she wants to keep the system in a set of safe states) that do not translate to objectives with discounted rewards.
An algorithm for solving a broader class of POSGs where all players have imperfect information was proposed in [5] . Individual players may have obtained different information throughout the course the game and they may have differring beliefs. The proposed approach uses dynamic programming to iteratively construct pure strategies by extending non-dominated pure strategies with one step; hence the number of pure strategies grows exponentially with the horizon. The one-sided partial observability in our game allows us to avoid such enumeration of pure strategies and define the dynamic programming operator over the expected utility values of subgames.
First we define the finite-horizon version of the pursuit-evasion game, define the value functions, and prove its shape and the convexity. We follow by a dynamic programming method for computing values of the game.
Finite-horizon game
We use the notion of finite-horizon POSGs, or extensive-form games, to reason about the infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion game with discounted rewards. An extensive-form game (EFG) is a tuple G = (N , H, Z, T , u, I). N is the set of players, in our case N = {p, e} where p stands for pursuer and e for the evader. Set H denotes a finite set of histories of actions taken by all players from the begining of the game. Every history corresponds to a node in the game tree; hence we use the terms history and node interchangeably. Each of the histories may be (1) terminal (h ∈ Z ⊆ H) where the game ends and players get utility u i (h), (2) controlled by the nature player who selects the successor node according to a fixed probability distribution known to all players, or (3) one of the players from simplify the notation we will use u(h) to denote pursuer's reward. An ordered list of transitions of player i from root to node h is referred to as a sequence. The allowed transitions in the game are modelled using a transition function T that provides a set of successor nodes for each non-terminal history. The imperfect observation of players is modelled via information sets I i that form a partition over histories h where player i ∈ N takes action. We assume perfect recall setting where the players never forget their past actions, i.e. for every I i ∈ I i , all histories h ∈ I i have the same player i's sequence. Each information set I i ∈ I i corresponds to one decision point of player i. A randomized behavioral strategy of player i assigns a distribution over actions to each of the information sets in I i . A Nash equilibrium (NE) in an EFG is a pair of behavioral strategies, in which each player plays a best response to the strategy of the opponent. We will now use this terminology to construct an EFG for a finite-horizon version of a pursuit-evasion game played on graph G = V, E with N pursuing units played for T rounds (we term T as the horizon). At every stage t ≤ T , pursuer's units occupy vertices s ∈ adj G (s t e ). We overload the operator adj G to apply it also on multisets representing positions of pursuer's units, i.e. ∈ adj G (s t p ) containing all the possible continuations of the pursuer (recall that in our formulation of the EFG, the pursuer acts first and the evader follows up while not observing last pursuer's action).
Shape of the value function
We have discussed that the game G In the following text we will show that value functions v t s 0 p are piecewise linear and convex (PWLC) for every finite t. The term linear will be used also to refer to an affine function. We will show that the pursuer needs to consider only a finite set of randomized behavioral strategies in order to play optimally in game G Proof. From the sequence-form LP for solving EFGs [6] and due to the finiteness of the set of evader's pure strategies in the finite game G e is multiplied by the probability b 0 (s 0 e ) that the evader will be spawned in s 0 e and this probability can be factored out from the respective constraints. We get therefore the following constraint for the root information set:
The convex combination of piecewise linear functions does not introduce extreme points at coordinates that were not present in P [s Proof. When the strategy σ p is fixed, the evader chooses a deterministic trail in the graph for every his initial vertex s Proof. This result follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. There is a finite set of randomized strategies Σ T sp that has to be considered by the pursuer and value of every such strategy is linear in b 0 . Thus the value function v t s p is a pointwise maximum taken over a finite set of linear functions, which is PWLC.
Every PWLC function can be represented by a finite set of α-vectors. Every such α-vector α = (α 1 , . . . , α |V| ) represents one of the affine functions by assigning an expected reward α i to each of the pure beliefs. Due to this fact we will overload the notation and consider a value function v t s p from Theorem 2 as a set of such α-vectors as well.
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 imply that every linear segment of the PWLC value function corresponds to one randomized strategy of the pursuer. This is similar to the POMDP case where each α-vector corresponds to one conditional plan. We will be therefore using terms α-vector and pursuer's strategy interchangeably.
Value iteration
The size of the EFG grows exponentially with horizon t. We propose a dynamic programming approach inspired by value iteration algorithms for either POMDPs [11, 8] or perfect information stochastic games [10] . We show that in horizon-t game players choose the starting point of a game with horizon t−1. The pursuer selects a starting location s 1 p in a horizon t − 1 game by playing one-shot strategy 
where belief b depends only on evader's strategy π e and initial belief b:
The computation of v t+1 by means of Equation (1) forms a dynamic programming operator H, such that v t+1 = Hv t .
Proof. We will prove the correctness of the Equation 1 by computing the value of the game G e (for every s 0 e ∈ V \ s p ). Let σ p and σ e be optimal behavioral strategies of the pursuer and evader with the restriction that the strategy in the first stage of the game is fixed to π p and π e . The expected reward of the pursuer when these strategies are followed and node h of the game is reached will be denoted as u πp,πe (h) and termed expected reward in h.
Lemma 2. The expected reward in the root node equals to: . Definition 3. Two deterministic game trees over nodes H 1 , H 2 are isomorphic if there exists a bijection ξ : H 1 → H 2 such that v ∈ H 1 is a successor of u ∈ H 1 if and only if ξ(v) is a successor of ξ(u), n ∈ H 1 is a pursuer's node if and only if ξ(n) is a pursuer's node, it is a terminal node if and only if ξ(n) is a terminal node and the utilities u(n) = u(ξ(n)). Moreover the trees have the same informational structure so that two nodes u, v ∈ H 1 are in the same information set if and only if nodes ξ(u), ξ(v) are in the same information set.
We can observe that subtrees of nodes s We reduced the probability of reaching non-representative histories in I 
Together with Equation (3) we get
If we allow players to choose π p and π e , they will apply the maxmin principle on Equation (4) which gives us Equation (1).
From value functions to optimal one-shot strategies
We now show how to compute strategies from value functions v t s p . At each stage, players have to decide about their randomized one-shot strategies π p and π e for the next move corresponding to the strategies from Equation (1). Due to the space constraints the LP for finding evader's optimal strategy was moved to the Appendix and we focus on computing π p .
Assume that the evader was not caught (i.e. se∈V\sp b(s e ) = 1). The pursuer now has to decide what action s p ∈ adj G (s p ) he will play first and what strategy α s p i ∈ v t s p he will follow next. He will follow each such strategy with probabilityπ(s p , i). The evader on the other hands best responds his strategy by deciding action s e for every his initial position s e . He chooses the one that minimizes expected reward against pursuer's randomized strategy (Equation (6)). 
The strategy π p is then π p (s p ) = 
Proof. We can derive a strategy for G 
Computing value functions
Our goal is to approximate value functions of an infinite horizon game by computing value functions of a sequence of finite horizon games G . Assume that value functions v t s p are known for every s p ∈ V N . We are about to compute value functions v t+1 s p by applying the dynamic programming operator H on value functions v t (i.e. v t+1 = Hv t ). We will proceed in two steps: (1) Firstly we compute a function Q 
where α s p (s e ) is the value of α-vector corresponding to σ s p evaluated at pure belief corresponding to evader's position s e .
Proof. Let us assume that pursuer played action s p in the first stage (drawn from π p ). The game moves to a shorter horizon game G t s p ,b with a belief updated according to Equation (2) . The α-vectors in v t s p represent all optimal mixed strategies of the pursuer for every possible belief. One of them, σ s p , has to be optimal continuation for the pursuer.
We know that the value of strategies is linear in belief (Lemma 1). It is therefore sufficient to compute the value of the strategy in each of the pure beliefs. If the evader is located at the same vertex with some of the pursuers, the game ends immediately and the pursuer's utility is 1. If the evader is not immediately caught she chooses an adjacent vertex s e so that the expected utility of the pursuer is minimized. We know that if evader plays s p in the first move and follows with σ The value function v t+1 s p can therefore be found by finding a set of strategies Π p for the first stage of the game and computing the pointwise maximum from respective Q t+1 πp
The set of such strategies Π p is however unknown. We propose an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that constructs both the set of strategies Π p and the value function v t s p incrementally by iteratively verifying whether the current set of the strategies Π p is sufficient for computing the value function v t+1 s p . The Algorithm 1 is constructing sets of strategiesΠ p and a corresponding estimate of value functionv t+1 s p = πp∈Πp Q t+1 πp s p , starting with an empty 
Uniqueness of solution
We will show the uniqueness and convergence properties by showing that the dynamic programming operator H (Equation 1) applied to value functions is a contraction and thus there is a unique set of value function satisfying the fixpoint property and the value iteration algorithm (recursive application of H) converges to it. We will show the contractivity of H under the following max-norm:
The operator H is a contraction with contractivity factor γ < 1 under max-norm.
Proof. Let us define Q v πp s p as the value of v from Equation 1 where the pursuer's strategy in the first stage is fixed to
The proof will closely follow the structure of the proof of Theorem 1 in [12] . First of all we will show that for every s p ∈ V N and every valid pursuer's strategy π p , the mapping v → Q APPENDIX A Proofs of technical lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 3
A. Evader is not caught in one step
The derivation of Equation (3) is then just a technical derivation involving operations with sums and normalization of conditional probability distributions. Throughout the derivation we will use the equation of the transformed belief (Equation (2) 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that σ 2 is a strategy profile applied in the subtree of n 2 . Let σ 1 be strategy profile applied in the subtree of n 1 defined as σ 1 (n) = σ 2 (ξ(n)) (this strategy profile will be valid in that subtree due to the fact that the subtrees are isomorphic). The expected reward u in both subtrees is the same under these strategies as they reach the nodes with the same utility (which is guaranteed by the bijection ξ). Hence if σ 2 is optimal
